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Abstract
While most security projects have focused on fend-
ing off attacks coming from outside the organizational
boundaries, a real threat has arisen from the people
who are inside those perimeter protections. Insider
threats have shown their power by hugely affecting
national security, financial stability, and the privacy
of many thousands of people. What is in the news
is the tip of the iceberg, with much more going on
under the radar, and some threats never being detected.
We propose a hybrid framework based on graphical
analysis and anomaly detection approaches, to com-
bat this severe cyber security threat. Our framework
analyzes heterogeneous data in isolating possible ma-
licious users hiding behind others. Empirical results
reveal this framework to be effective in distinguishing
the majority of users who demonstrate typical behav-
ior from the minority of users who show suspicious
behavior.
1. Introduction
The battle between malicious but trusted insiders
and organizations in safeguarding information assets is
the biggest and fastest growing cyber security threat
in this digital age. Insider threat, or the threat from a
malicious insider who is defined as “a current or former
employee, contractor or business partner who has, or
had, authorized access to an organization’s network,
system or data and intentionally exceeded or misused
that access in a manner that negatively affected the
confidentiality, integrity or availability of the organiza-
tion’s information or information systems” [7] has been
identified as a primary concern within the cybersecu-
rity community. Financial loss and reputation damage
caused by this “known unknown” cybersecurity threat
far outweighs that caused by external attacks. Thus,
the majority of private and governmental organizations
have identified the severity of the threat posed by
insiders and focused on security control improvements.
However, the seriousness of this problem is still rising
at an alarming rate threatening most critical infrastruc-
ture segments.
One of the most recent articles from CSO magazine
[1] compared the cost between external and internal
attacks and noted that while it takes about 50 days
to fix a data breach caused by an internal attack, it
only takes 2 to 5 days in the case of external at-
tacks. Moreover, “attacks by malicious insiders are also
the costliest to fix ($145,000), followed by denial of
service ($127,000) and Web-based attacks ($96,000)”,
indicating the severity of this problem.
The unpredictable nature of human behavior makes
this complex issue much more complicated than ex-
pected. This is aggravated by the mobility and hyper-
connectivity of people. Insider threat research and sur-
veys suggest this problem cannot be considered only as
a data driven problem; it needs to be considered as data
and behavior driven problem [5]. A close examination
of user behavior can spot trends and such informa-
tion can be used in tightening radars on suspicious
users. Different parameters govern users’ day to day
actions, and behavioral changes exposed in workplace
environments will extend the possibilities of isolating
suspicious users from the rest of the employees. Orga-
nizations can suffer after effects such as unmotivated
employees, inefficient work behavior, if an innocent
user is classified as suspicious. Thus, the decision of
naming a person as suspicious should be a smooth but
complex process. Obviously, insider threat detection
will focus on isolating suspicious users from the others;
but it may not be practical to point an employee as
a malicious attacker. Also, the effectiveness of the
process totally depends on the ability of analysis of
many parameters as possible. Consideration of above
facts led us to think of an insider threat detection
framework as described in the rest of the paper.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we propose a frame-
work for isolation of malicious users based on graphi-
cal and anomaly detection techniques. The proposed
architecture is given in Figure 1, and has two ma-
jor components “Graphical Processing Unit” (GPU)
and “Anomaly Detection Unit” (ADU). Data from
multidimensional sources of an enterprise network is
formatted and fed into the GPU, which generates a
graph which represents interrelationships between in-
formational assets of the network. These input streams
can be from different, i.e., heterogeneous, informa-
tional sources with different data formats. These data
streams can be from event logs (logon/logoff), email
logs, HTTP records, social network access data and
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Figure 1. Framework
various HR records such as psychometric data. Once
the informational assets are mapped into a network,
several graph parameters are calculated for each user.
Since the final goal is to isolate the most anomalous
users from the rest, all the attributes are computed
for individual users. The next task of the GPU is to
generate induced subgraphs of each user for differ-
ent levels of neighborhoods. Several relevant subgraph
properties (vertex count, edge count, density, diameter
and number of peers) are calculated for each level of
subgraphs. Calculated graph and subgraph parameters
are fed into the ADU. In parallel to the above process,
time-varying data also fed into the ADU. The isolation
forest algorithm is executed for isolating anomalous
users within the ADU unit. Anomaly scores for each
user is generated as the output of the ADU. These
values are used in identifying and separating possible
malicious users from the rest of the workforce.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes mostly related work contributed
to insider threat detection research. Section 3 is the
dataset we used in this research while section 4 de-
scribed the adopted methodology. Experimental results
are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the
paper indicating conclusions and future directions.
2. Related Work
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based ap-
proaches, visualization strategies, honeypot/honeynet
approaches and system call based methods are several
techniques adopted from external threat detection in
finding solutions for insider problem [17]. The work
presented here is focused on the combination of graph-
based techniques and anomaly detection approaches.
This section will only discuss the most related work
under the above two techniques specifically in the
insider threat domain.
The specialized network anomaly detection
(SNAD) model proposed by [6] is a graph based
approach used for detecting insider actions in
collaborative information systems. In their model
access logs are mapped into a bipartite graph. The
similarity of users are compared based on the number
of subjects a user accesses from a collaborative
information system using the cosine similarity
measure. In order to determine if a particular access is
anomalous or not, the authors considered the influence
of a user on the similarity of the access network by
suppressing each user at a time. Even though they
achieved better performance over their competitors
(spectral anomaly detection model), they identified
difficulties in implementation on real world networks.
Another study [4] proposed a proactive insider
threat detection by graph learning and psychological
modeling of users. The proposed model is a combi-
nation of structural anomaly detection and psycholog-
ical profiling and explored the possibility of including
dynamical properties of nodal attributes. They have
evaluated results based on a publicly available gaming
data set which might not be very similar to enterprise
system and network data. Althebyn and Panda [2] have
also suggested the use of graph theory to formalize two
components, knowledge graph and object dependency
graphs. A knowledge graph represents knowledge units
for a given insider and they are updated over the time.
Dependency graph is a global hierarchical graph that
shows all dependencies among various objects. Even
though this model tries to include accumulated knowl-
edge of the insider over time on systems and objects it
can be improved by including several other parameters
such as user’s behavioral patterns and psychological
aspects.
Another study performed by Nance and Marty [12]
introduced the use of bipartite graphs for identifying
and visualizing insider threat. They tried to establish
acceptable insider behavior patterns based on work-
group role classifications. Although this approach is
quite useful for detecting certain insider threats, it
has the limitation of a high false positive rate. The
framework suggested by [8] is another graph-based ap-
proach for malicious insider threat detection which uses
the minimum description length principle for detecting
anomalous activities. A recent paper [10] proposed the
use of authentication subgraphs for analyzing users
behavior within an enterprise network utilizing a set
of subgraph attributes in user profiling. Time series
analysis of subgraphs and use of bipartite graphs are
also introduced in their work, targeting on a much
comprehensive analysis in their ongoing work. Another
related framework, the BANDIT (Behavioral Anomaly
Detection for Insider Threat) [3] also proposed a two-
stage anomaly detection approach in managing insider
attacks which compared user’s behaviour based on own
and peer baselines.
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3. The Data Set
Due to the lack of availability of proper insider
threat datasets we have utilized the insider threat
dataset published by CERT Carnegie Mellon University
for this research [15]. The dataset “R4.2.tar.bz” has
been used for this analysis. According to the dataset
owners, this is a “dense needle” dataset with a fair
amount of red team scenarios. This dataset consists of
six broad types of data records (HTTP, logon, device,
file, email and psychometric) of 1000 employees over
a 17 months period. All HTTP records contain user,
PC, URL and web page content with time stamps.
“Logon.csv” consists of user logon/logoff activities
with the corresponding PC with timestamps. “Logon”
and “Logoff” are the two types of activities can be
found in data records. “Logon” activity corresponds to
either a user login event or a screen unlock event, while
the “Logoff” event corresponds to user logoff event.
Screen locks are not recorded in this dataset. The third
data file “device.csv” is a collection of data records
of removable media usage. It indicates insert/remove
actions with the relevant user, PC, and timestamp. De-
tails of file copies are stored in “file.csv” file with date,
user, PC, filename, and content. To get the friendship
network of users, the CERT dataset provides email
communication records including from, to, cc and
bcc fields. “psychometric.csv” provides psychometric
scores based on big five personality traits or five-factor
model (FFM) for the definition of personality.
Among the different work roles which in the
dataset, we performed our analysis with three job roles.
Table 1 shows the statistics of selected data records.
4. Methodology
The goal of this paper is to introduce a framework
for mitigating the insider threat problem using a combi-
nation of graph-based approach and an anomaly detec-
tion technique. This framework will utilize multidimen-
sional inputs such as user interactions with hardware
assets, web access records, email correspondences and
psychometric figures. The graph-based approach is a
prominent method of identifying inter-relationships be-
tween multidimensional entities. A user’s interactions
with devices are illustrated in a weighted, undirected
large scale bipartite graph G = (V,E,W ), where V
is the set of vertices (users), E is the set of edges,
and W is the set of edge weights. Set of vertices
comprises of two types of entities, users and devices
while edges represent user’s interaction with the device.
Edge weights correspond to the number of “Logoff” ac-
tivities which appeared during the whole time duration
of the dataset between an individual user and a device.
Graph visualization was carried out using NodeXL [14]
and all the other calculations were done using the
R statistical computing language [13]. The following
Figure 2. First order subgraph topology for all
users
subsections describe the theoretical background and the
implemented methodology in detail.
Even though the dataset comprises of both “logon”
and “logoff” records for individual users, we utilize
only the “logoff” events for network mapping. The
reason behind this is that we cannot distinguish logon
activities, and screen unlocks as they both recorded
as “logon” events. However, the screen locks are not
recorded, and only the logoff events are recorded as
“logoff” events. The representation of the use of remov-
able media also can be represented by an edge between
the corresponding user and the device. However, this
will convert the graph into a multigraph where the exis-
tence of multiple edges is possible among two vertices.
To keep the simplicity of the first phase of analysis,
we shall exclude the representation of such edges.
Integration of the friendship network into the same
network would change the structure of the network, and
it will lose the multipartite property. Therefore, inter-
user relationships based on email data has not been
considered for graphical representation. The following
graph attributes for individual users are captured from
the above graph G for further analysis.
4.1. Graph Parameters
User’s vertex degree (du): The degree of a vertex
is the number of edges connected to it. In the context
of this analysis, we calculated the degree only for the
users. Therefore this value represents the number of
devices accessed by an individual user.
4.2. User Subgraph (USG) Parameters
As the next step of the analysis, the focus is on
the construction of subgraphs for each user. A deep
dive into the different order of subgraphs is how we
extract relevant graph parameters in graph analysis.
In this work user subgraphs are constructed until the
fifth order of neighborhood. We define the user sub-
graph (USG) as a weighted undirected graph Gu =
(Vu, Eu,Wu) for the entire period of the dataset. Vu
represents the vertex set of Gu while Eu represents
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TABLE 1. Data statistics
Functional Unit Department Number
of Users
HTTP Logon Device File Psychometric
Research And Engineering Engineering 129 4,196,817 101,782 67,916 75,335 129
Research And Engineering Software Management 101 3,295,774 82,187 44,049 58,173 101
Research And Engineering Research 101 3,332,576 79,362 30,906 41,292 101
the edge set of Gu. Link weights are similar to that
of the original graph. We have noticed that all the
first order subgraphs have a star topology as shown in
Figure 2. The number of external nodes can be within
(1 : total number of devices). This factor is because
of the disjoint nature of the two type of vertices. Even
though we cannot extract much information on device
access similarities with first order subgraphs, we will
continue to use following subgraph properties of first
order subgraphs in addition to the higher order sub-
graph properties for the completeness of this analysis.
1) Vertex count vuj for j = 1 : 5
2) Edge count euj for j = 1 : 5
3) Density puj for j = 1 : 5
The density of a graph is the ratio of edges to all
possible edges given the number of vertices.
4) Diameter duj for j = 1 : 5
The diameter of a graph is the largest shortest path
between any two vertices.
5) Number of peers puj for j = 1 : 5
Since the main focus of this analysis is to identify
the most anomalous users, we have chosen this
parameter for evaluation in addition to the basic
graph properties.
The distribution of the above properties has been
illustrated as histograms and further discussed in the
“Experimental Results” section of this paper.
4.3. Time Dependent Parameters
We believe that it is not sufficient to consider
only the above parameters in identifying malicious
insiders without the temporal properties. To carry out
a complete and comprehensive analysis, the follow-
ing time-based parameters and personality values have
been identified as important input parameters for the
anomaly detection algorithm.
4.3.1. Individual logon logoff events. This parameter
can be used in identifying users abnormal logon/logoff
activities as most disgruntled insiders tend to commit
malicious activities after hours [5]. Identifying users’
baseline behavior on system/device access is an essen-
tial part of malicious insider threat detection problem.
For each user, four parameters (minimum, maximum,
mean and mode) logon and logoff values have been
calculated. Those four parameters are also fed as an
input parameters to the anomaly detection unit.
4.3.2. Removable media usage events. Removable
media is among the most popular method used in theft
of Intellectual Property (IP) in extracting confidential
information from organizations [5]. Tracking the use
of removable media can be an excellent information
source for identifying suspicious events by trusted in-
siders . Baseline behavior of removable media usage
is captured by the minimum, maximum, mean and
mode time of “Insert” and “Remove” activities as in
the logon/logoff event analysis. Time gap between
consecutive “Insert - Remove” action has also been
identified as a good source of information to capture
large file downloads. The daily number of files copied
by an individual is also used in this analysis.
4.3.3. Web Access Patterns. We can think of users’
online behavior as a reflection of their offline behavior,
as they tend to publish their feelings, thoughts, likes
and dislikes through social media. In addition to the
above fact, web access patterns is also a good indi-
cation of their online behavior. Disgruntled insiders
tend to access competitors websites and recruitment
agency websites to understand and gather information
on potential opportunities. We have identified that the
users online behavior analysis will be comprehensive
if we include multiple social media data sources and
web access records. However due to the limitations of
data availability on all these domains we will be strict
only to web access records for this research work. Also,
it is evident that the content of web pages may have
a direct link with users suspicious behavior. However,
we will again restrict content analysis of web pages in
this analysis and will consider it as a future direction
of our continuing work.
4.4. Personality Parameters
Psychometric data : Psychological behavior is one
of the other aspects linked to insider attacks. Sudden
behavioral changes can be indications of misuse of
privileges. Verbal behavior, personality traits, unautho-
rized absences, aggressive behavior, are a few indica-
tors which can be considered as small markers which
come before the big attack. Therefore nontechnical be-
havioral changes are captured through the psychometric
data provided in the dataset.
Table 2 is a summary of all properties we have
identified in this analysis to consider as input param-
eters in to the isolation forest algorithm to separate
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TABLE 2. Selected parameter set
Module Parameter
Graph Degree of vertex
Sub Graphs
Vertex Count
Edge Count
Density
Weighted Diameter
Number of Peers
Logon/Logoff
Events
Minimum/Maximum Logon Time
Mean/Mode Logon Time
Minimum/Maximum Logoff Time
Mean/Mode Logoff Time
Removable Media
Minimum/Maximum Insert Time
Mean/Mode Insert Time
Minimum/Maximum Remove Time
Mean/Mode Remove Time
Maximum number of daily file copies
Mode of number of daily file copies
Web Access Patterns Number of Unique URLs
Psychometric
Observations
O (Openness to experience)
C (Conscientiousness)
E (Extroversion)
A (Agreeableness)
N (Neuroticism)
most anomalous users. Due to space limitations, we
have listed some pairs of parameters in the same line
in the table, e.g., the line ”Minimum/Maximum Insert
Time” covers two parameters, ”Minimum Insert Time”,
and ”Maximum Insert Time”.
4.5. Anomaly Detection
Due to the complex nature of insider threat prob-
lem, it is extremely hard to pinpoint a user as a
malicious insider. Therefore, the first step should be
the identification of possible malicious insiders who are
maximally deviating from peers as well as their normal
behavior. Therefore, as the second stage of our analysis,
we will focus on implementing an anomaly detection
algorithm based on the important graphical properties
and time dependent properties identified at the previous
stage of this analysis. The anomaly detection algo-
rithm adopted in this analysis is the “Isolation forest”
algorithm, which stands out in effectively separating
anomalous events from the rest of the instances [11].
Isolation Forest Algorithm - iForest: The isola-
tion forest algorithm is a model-based approach which
explicitly isolates anomalies without constructing a
typical profile instance. Linear time complexity with a
low constant and low memory requirements drives us
to use it in our experiments as the enormous amount of
information need to be analyzed in the field of insider
threat. The use of the isolation forest algorithm for this
work is part of the overall research effort within our
research group at RMIT University and CA Pacific,
with the details as presented in [16], where it is applied
TABLE 3. Summary of number of parameters
Property Number of Input
parameters
Graph properties 1
Sub graph properties 25
Logon/Logoff behavior 8
Removable media usage 10
Web access patterns 1
Psychometric observations 5
to a very large enterprise system for anomaly detection.
This algorithm also performs well with a large
number of irrelevant attributes and instances where
training data set does not contain any anomalies. This
method generates an ensemble of iTrees for a given
dataset and the instances with the short average path of
iTrees are considered to be anomalies. If the calculated
anomaly score value, s is very close to 1 it can be
regarded as a definite anomaly. Instances with s much
smaller than 0.5 can be considered normal situations.
If all the instances return s ≈ (0.5), then the entire
sample deemed to be not having any distinct anomalies.
Based on the above-described algorithm, anomaly
scores were calculated for each user, for each order
of subgraph for (1:5) separately, based on the five
graph properties identified in subsection 4.2. In this
case the iForest algorithm is executed considering 5
input parameters. We believe it would be much ef-
fective if we incorporate parameter values calculated
for the different order of subgraphs when calculating
anomaly scores. Therefore anomaly scores correspond-
ing to subgraph properties have been computed using
25 distinct values obtained for 5 various parameters of
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4thand 5th order of subgraphs. Similarly,
anomaly scores correspond to graph parameters, time-
dependent parameters and personality parameters (as
summarized in Table 2) were calculated independently
using iForest algorithm. Finally, anomaly scores corre-
spond to each user is calculated as a combination of
all the parameters described in Table 2, in which case
the number of input parameters for the algorithm was
50. Breakdown of the number of parameters has been
summarized in Table 3.
5. Experimental Results
This section is dedicated to a comprehensive dis-
cussion of results obtained through our analysis. The
discussion is based on the “Research and Engineer-
ing/Engineering” work role, and final results for all
three work roles considered in this analysis are sum-
marized in Table 4.
Figure 3 is an illustration of the user’s device access
network. Users are represented in spheres while devices
are represented by triangles. Vertex size corresponds
to the degree of the vertex, which is an indication of
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Figure 3. Users’ device access network
Figure 4. Degree distribution of users
the number of devices accessed by a particular user.
The width of all edges corresponds to the number
of “Logoff” events which occurred during the entire
period of the dataset. We continue to use the graphical
representation of informational assets as in our previ-
ous work [9], as it can be used to precisely indicate
interrelationships between informational assets. Also,
it is an efficient means of extracting basic essential
parameters of massively dense log data.
5.1. Graph Parameters
The individual degree distribution is illustrated as
a histogram in Figure 4. The degree of a user is the
number of devices a user access in this analysis. This
figure reveals that the majority of users have a lower
degree while the minority of users have the larger de-
gree compared to others. We can think of two possible
reasons behind the few number of users in the tail of
the distribution. Either these employees are assigned to
multiple devices to perform their day to day operations
or an anomalous behavior. As previously mentioned,
we should not directly conclude any of the insiders in
the tail of the distribution as suspicious just by looking
at the number of devices they accessed. However, we
can think them as high-risk profiles among the others.
5.2. Subgraph Parameters
Figure 5(a) illustrates the histogram of vertex count
for the different order of user subgraphs. These his-
tograms show the majority of users have a small num-
ber of vertices in their subgraphs while the minority
of users have a larger number of vertices in their sub-
graphs resulting much complex user subgraphs. Figure
5(b) is an illustration of the distribution of edge count
across the different order of subgraphs. These values
also follow a distribution which is very similar to vertex
count. The subgraph density and the weighted diameter
for all USGs also shown in figure 5(c) and figure
5(d) respectively. Density histograms show a similar
pattern for most of the cases. Even though we could
not find any obvious reason for this nature of distribu-
tion, we think that subgraph density is an important
attribute for this kind of evaluations. Therefore, we
continued to use that parameter as an input for the
ADU. Diameter distribution for lower order subgraphs
shows similar behavior with a single peak data bar
while higher order subgraphs show similar behavior
with two distinct peaks. These peaks are an indication
of cluster/clusters of users who have similar behavioral
patterns. The other subgraph property, number of peers
also indicates two broader groups of users corresponds
to two significant data bars and few other small groups
of users. These results indicate the significance of
higher order subgraph analysis in finding little clues
among the enormous amount of data.
5.3. Time Dependent Parameters
This subsection discusses the results obtained for
other time-varying properties, which were identified
as some of the other governing parameters of insider
threat problem.
5.3.1. Individual Logon-Logoff Behavior. Figure
6(a) is an illustration of users logon behavior for the
entire period of the dataset. By looking at this graph,
it is evident that the majority of logon activities occur
during early office hours, which can be interpreted
as the first logon event of the day. There are some
other logon events, especially when we consider the
“maximum” logon time which occurs during regular
working hours, which can be treated as logins followed
by screen locks during the day. The logon times which
we need to pay more attention are the events which
happen during after office hours. We can identify a
few users who have minimum and maximum logon
times occurred during the late night, which might be
unusual for normal operations. In real world enterprise
networks, we can expect system user logon activities
during this type of time periods for scheduled jobs such
as backups, log rotations and routine activities. But if
we find such logon activities for non-system users, that
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Figure 5. Histograms of subgraph properties
is for human users, it needs to be further investigated to
differentiate between a genuine or a suspicious activity.
One of the other critical parameters of insider threat
detection, the “logoff” behavior of users are illustrated
in Figure 6(b). This graph also shows the mean, mode,
minimum and maximum logoff times of each user for
the entire period. As can be seen on the graph majority
of “logoff” events happen during late office hours. As
in the case of “logon” behavior we are concern about
after hours logoff events which are abnormal compared
to the majority events happen during regular business
hours.
5.3.2. Removable media usage. Figure 7 is an
illustration of users’ removable media usage statistics.
Similar to logon/logoff analysis, time dependencies
of removable media usage has also been investigated.
Figure 7(a) and (b) shows the maximum, minimum,
mean and mode times for USB connect and disconnect
events respectively. One important factor noticed
through this analysis is only a 20% (37/129) of
employees from the selected designation used USB
file copies, which can not be considered as a typical
behavioral pattern among the chosen group. In
this case also events which occur during regular
office hours can be regarded as normal while events
happened after hours can be either suspicious or work
related. Also, we have to be vigilant about large file
copying during after hours as well as normal business
hours. This property can be yield by analysis of the
time gap between consecutive connect and disconnect
events, which we have not computed in this exercise.
Figure 7(c) and (d) demonstrate the variation of users
daily number of file accesses. To identify suspicious
file copies we have considered only the maximum
and mode of the number of file copies per day by an
individual. If the difference between the maximum
and the mode of the number of file copies is unusual,
it can be considered as a suspicious file download.
By looking at the histogram, it is clear that the
above difference is less than four for the majority of
employees while a few of the users deviated from this
pattern.
Web Access Patterns. For the completeness of this
work, we have selected a single parameter, based on
individual users’ web access patterns. Distribution of
the unique number of URLs accessed by individual
users is illustrated in Figure 8. This results also illus-
trate few outliers from rest of the group, which can be
directed for further investigations. We will be exploring
the means of integration of our previous work [9] to get
more input parameters based on web access patterns in
the continuation of this work.
5.4. Anomaly Detection
Figure 9(a) illustrates the anomaly score distribu-
tion of the user base for the different order of sub-
graphs and the combination of all subgraph properties.
Anomaly score distribution clearly indicates major two
types of users based on the above-proposed subgraph
properties. The users in the tail of the distribution have
small anomaly score values, and they do not change
with the order of subgraph. However, the other set of
users who are in the main segment of the distribution
have higher anomaly scores and vary based on the order
of subgraph. Based on the Isolation Forest algorithm,
2644
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Figure 6. Users’ logon and logoff behavior
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Figure 7. Removable media usage behavior
users with anomalous scores very close to 1 can be
considered as definite anomalies while the instances
with anomaly scores much smaller than 0.5 are safe to
consider as typical cases.
5.5. Parameter Dependency
Figure 9(b) is an indication of how the anomaly
scores are distributed on different input parameters
chosen in this analysis. The dense graph indicated few
points above the “Red” color horizontal line which is
equivalent to an anomaly score of 0.8. Users belong
to those points can be considered as anomalous users.
Figure 8. Distribution of unique URLs accessed by
users
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Figure 9. Anomaly score distribution
To get a better understanding of results illustrated
in Figure 9(b), the distribution of users with respect
to anomaly scores computed based on all identified
parameters is shown as a histogram in Figure 10. We
find that the majority of users have anomaly scores in
the interval [0.4, 0.7], which can be considered to be
normal, while a minority of users have anomaly score
values above 0.7 which can be regarded as suspicious.
The single outlier with anomaly score value higher than
0.8 can be tagged for further investigations.
In the case of insider threat detection and preven-
tion, the priority is on the isolation of suspicious users
from the rest of workforce. Since it was the major
intention of this work, we have used the following
technique to validate above results by computing the
percentage of suspicious users based on the different
parameters identified. To perform that, the calculated
anomaly scores are mapped into a binary vector (0, 1)
based on a predefined threshold value for each param-
eter. The threshold value for each parameter is selected
as the (maximum value − 0.1), keeping a margin
of 10% as in most of the experimental cases. In the
particular case of anomaly scores of ≈ 0.5 for the entire
dataset, we will exclude that parameter in the validation
process as that parameter do not contribute much in
finding suspicious activities. For all the other cases
anomaly scores are mapped as described above. We
propose the following two methods to check parameter
dependencies as discussed below.
Case I : In this approach percentage of suspicious
users are calculated considering the predicted num-
ber of anomalous parameters at a time from 1 to 6.
Calculated percentages are summarized in Table 4.
Calculated percentage values reveal more than 79% of
users can be considered to have normal behavior, while
the others have suspicious behavior. Also noted there
are no users who are suspicious when considered more
than three parameters together. The complex nature of
insider threat problem can govern this type of results.
Case II : In this method, we proposed looking at
the all possible combinations of parameters from the
six main categories selected for this analysis. After
considering the results of above Case I, we could not
expect a significant change in results. However, we be-
lieve this would be a possible approach in identification
of parameter dependencies.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have introduced a framework
based on graphical and anomaly detection approaches
for identifying potential malicious insiders. This model
generates anomaly scores based on different input
parameters for each user. Considering the nature of
insider attacks a user can be deemed to be suspicious
even if a single parameter has been found to be sus-
picious. We have adopted graph, subgraph properties
and statistical methods in generating input parameters
for the anomaly detection algorithm through multi-
domain real world information. Empirical results reveal
the importance of selected properties in combating this
patient and smart attack. We also found that more
than 79% of users with common behavioral patterns
while the rest of the group shows suspicious behavior
based on different parameters. Users belong to the
minority group can be tagged and directed for further
investigation.
In the continuation of this work, we will focus on
integrating as many as possible input parameters to
improve the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
It would include social network data which can be con-
sidered as a good source of online behavior and other
statistical inputs from email and instant messaging
communications. We believe this framework would be
much more useful if we can include data from content
analysis of other sources such as websites access by
users, emails sent/received by users and file transfers to
removable media. We will focus on integrating several
other graphical parameters, few other statistical param-
eters such as time gap between USB insert/remove
2646
TABLE 4. Statistics on parameter dependency
Functional unit Department
Percentage of Users Corresponds to Number of Anomalous Parameters (%)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Research And Engineering Engineering 83.72 16.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Research And Engineering Software Management 82.18 15.84 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
Research And Engineering Research 79.21 17.82 2.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Figure 10. Anomaly score distribution of users
actions in expanding this framework. Also, we will
explore the possibilities of integration of similarity
based clustering mechanism which we have introduced
in our previous work for web access pattern analysis
[9], with the proposed model. Another focus is on
extending the analysis for the entire dataset and validate
results with the 2 insider threat cases simulated in the
dataset. The other main aspect we are looking towards
is the use of temporal properties in graph analysis to
incorporate time factor instead of statistical analysis.
Finally, the main goal of this work, as well as our
previous and future work is to formulate an efficient,
scalable and automated insider threat detection and
prediction framework.
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